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Abstract 
 
The treaty creating the WTO replaced the GATT dispute resolution system, which contained 
no formal sanctions for breach of agreement as a practical matter, with a system that results in 
centrally authorized sanctions against recalcitrant violators of WTO trade agreements.  We 
examine the important features of the new system, and argue that the institutionalization of a 
sanctioning mechanism was not motivated by a perceived need to increase the penalty for 
violations, but rather by a need to decrease the penalty.  In particular, the GATT system relied 
on unilateral retaliation and reputation to police the bargain, and toward its end unilateral 
retaliation became excessive, interfering with opportunities for efficient breach.  The WTO 
mechanism for arbitrating the magnitude of proposed sanctions is the major innovation under 
WTO law, and ensures that sanctions are not set too high. 
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 This paper is a contribution to the growing theoretical literature on the positive political 
economy of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which incorporates the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and supplementary agreements on trade in goods, the General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).1  The focus of the paper is on the procedures for dispute 
settlement set out in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes (the Dispute Settlement Understanding or DSU).2  Our goal is to develop an economic 
explanation for the structure of the rules and procedures of the DSU.  
The point of departure is the proposition that the WTO agreements are, in effect, 
contracts among the political actors who negotiated and signed them.  As with all contracts, it 
is in the interest of the signatories to maximize the joint gains from trade -- that is, to enable 
the signatories to attain their Pareto frontier.3  Drawing on public choice theory, we further 
posit that the welfare of political officials is best measured by their political support4 -- the 
factors that affect their ability to retain political power.  A treaty on the Pareto frontier for 
political actors will then have the property that no alternative treaty can increase the political 
support for one signatory official without decreasing the political support for another.  It is our 
thesis that the rules and procedures for renegotiation and dispute resolution in the WTO, which 
we set out in detail below, are explicable by this logic of joint political welfare maximization.  
This claim may seem obvious, but it is the details of the argument that make it interesting.  In 
elaborating the argument we draw considerably on the public choice literature and on the 
economic theory of contracts.   
 The analysis focuses on three central features of the WTO system that we believe have 
not been assigned sufficient importance or adequately explained by traditional international 
                                                           
1 See Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments – Results Of The 
Uruguay Round [hereinafter Legal Instruments] vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).  The Agreement includes a 
version of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that is substantially different from that promulgated in 1947.  
See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT 
1947].  See also Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Rounds of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 
15, 1994, Legal Instruments vol. 5, 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).  See generally General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations (The Uruguay Round): Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, 
Dec. 15, 1993, Legal Instruments vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. 29 (1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. 
2 See Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Legal Instruments vol. 31, 33 
I.L.M. 112 (1994) [hereinafter DSU]. 
3 See Warren F. Schwartz & Alan O. Sykes, Toward a Positive Theory of the Most Favored Nation Obligation and 
Its Exceptions in the WTO/GATT System, 16 Int’l Rev. of L. & Econ. 27, 39 (1996) [hereinafter Schwartz & Sykes]. 
4 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 29. 
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law scholars.5  The first can be found in the rules structuring the renegotiation and modification 
of WTO commitments. A prominent aspect of these provisions is that a member nation that 
wishes to deviate from its commitments may do so even if it is unable to secure permission 
from other nations by offers of compensatory trade concessions.  If negotiations over 
compensation reach impasse, the nation wishing to deviate may proceed, and adversely 
affected nations may then withdraw “substantially equivalent” concessions in response.  The 
second feature on which we focus involves the sanctions for breach of obligations.  After a 
country is adjudged to be in violation of a WTO agreement, sanctions are limited to the 
withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions previously granted to the country 
committing the violation by the country(ies) harmed by the violation.  More severe sanctions, 
which might at times be necessary if the violator is to be coerced into complying with its 
obligations, are not permitted.  The third, related feature on which we focus concerns the 
measurement of "substantially equivalent" concessions.  After a party has been found to be in 
violation of its obligations, it has a “reasonable time” to correct the problem.  Only if it fails to 
do so within that time are sanctions allowed at all, and even then the sanctions are limited to 
measures “substantially equivalent” to the ongoing harm caused by the violation after the 
"reasonable time" for cure has elapsed.  No sanctions are allowed for harm caused prior to that 
point in time. 
 We believe that these features can be understood using the economic theory of contract 
remedies. Economic theory teaches that a key objective of an enforcement system is to induce 
a party to comply with its obligations whenever compliance will yield greater benefits to the 
promisee than costs to the promisor, while allowing the promisor to depart from its obligations 
whenever the costs of compliance to the promisor exceed the benefits to the promisee. In the 
parlance of contact theory, the objective is to deter inefficient breaches but to encourage 
efficient ones.6   In the sections to follow we will argue that the WTO provisions respecting 
renegotiation and the settlement of disputes over breach of obligations are carefully designed to 
                                                           
5 We sketch these provisions here, and document them in detail below. 
6 See Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 290 (1988); see also Robert L. Birmingham, Breach of 
Contract, Damage Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 Rutgers L. Rev. 273, 284-86 (1970) (“Repudiation of 
obligations should be encouraged where the promisor is able to profit from his default after placing his promisee in 
as good a position as he would have occupied had performance been rendered.  . . .  To penalize such adjustments 
through overcompensation of the innocent party is to discourage efficient reallocation of community resources. . . .  
Rigidity resulting from thus binding a party to his undertaking limits the factor and product mobility essential to 
proper functioning of the market mechanism.”) 
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facilitate efficient adjustments to unanticipated circumstances.  We also conclude that formal 
sanctions in the WTO system are relatively unimportant to the other goal of contract remedies 
– the deterrence of inefficient breach. 
Section I provides some pertinent background from the economic theory of contracts.  
Section II addresses renegotiation within the WTO system.  Sections III and IV then consider 
the provisions for sanctioning nations discovered to be in violation of their commitments. 
 
I. Efficient Adjustment of Contractual Commitments: Of Damages and Specific  
            Performance, Liability Rules and Property Rules 
 
 Many contracts are negotiated under conditions of considerable complexity and 
uncertainty, and it is not economical for the parties to specify in advance how they ought to 
behave under every conceivable contingency.  In such contracts, circumstances may arise in 
which it is in the joint interests of the parties for one of them to deviate from its commitments 
or “breach” the contract. 
There are essentially two mechanisms that parties to incomplete private contracts 
employ to encourage efficient performance of commitments, while facilitating efficient breach 
of commitments.  The first involves the award of expectation damages, which place the 
promisee in as good a position as it would have been in if the promisor had performed.  
Expectation damages thus deter inefficient breach, because the promisor will not wish to 
violate and pay expectation damages unless the promisor gains more from the breach than the 
promisee loses, in which case breach is efficient.7 The weakness of this approach is that the 
measurement of damages by a court is costly, and errors in assessing damages may deter 
efficient breach if they are too high or permit inefficient breach if they are too low.8   
 The mechanism that employs expectation damages as the means for inducing 
performance when it is efficient, and breach when it is not, is known as a “liability rule.” A 
                                                           
7 See Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law (4th ed. 1991), 117-26; John H. Barton, The Economic Basis of 
Damages for Breach of Contract, 1 J. Legal Stud. 277, 283-89 (1972); Birmingham, supra note 6, at 284-86, Steven 
Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11 Bell J. Econ. 466 (1980). 
8 See Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient Breach Fallacy, 18 J. Legal Stud. 1, 6-7 (1989), see generally Alan Schwartz, 
The Case for Specific Performance, 89 Yale L.J. 271 (1979); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific 
Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of Contract Remedies, 83 Mich. L. Rev. 341 (1984). 
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party who wishes to deviate from its commitments may do so without the need to secure the 
permission of any adversely affected party, but is liable for damages as a result.9 
The second mechanism that can encourage efficient performance while allowing 
efficient breach involves injunctive relief against a party that contemplates breach – an order 
for specific performance.   Here, the promisor is directed to perform and a failure to do so will 
be punished so severely that a party will never prefer violating the order directing performance 
to complying with its obligation.  But the promisor can still avoid its commitments by securing 
permission from the promisee, usually by paying for it.  Since the promisor will pay no more 
than the value to it of the breach, and the promisee will accept no less than the value of the 
harm it will suffer from the breach, an agreement permitting the promisor to breach can be 
reached only when the benefit to the promisor of the breach exceeds the harm to the promisee 
resulting from the breach -- that is, when breach is efficient. 
A mechanism whereby the promisor must secure the permission of the promisee before 
deviating from its obligations is a form of “property rule.10”  The term comes from the analogy 
to tangible property, which ordinarily cannot legally be taken from one private party by another 
unless the latter party grants permission, usually by selling it.  A property rule here avoids the 
difficulties associated with having a court compute expectation damages.  But it introduces 
other costs – those associated with the transaction costs of bargaining between the promisor 
and the promisee over the possibility of modifying obligations, including those attributable to 
strategic behavior during the bargaining process.  When these costs are sufficiently low in 
relation to the judicial and error costs of expectation damages, however, the property rule 
mechanism will be preferable.  It is also likely to be preferable if deviation from obligations is 
always inefficient. 
 This background will be quite helpful in our discussion of the WTO system.  As we 
explain below, the system consistently employs liability rules rather than property rules to 
protect WTO commitments against breach.  It does so, we believe, out of concern that an 
alternative approach would make it too difficult for WTO members to modify their 
commitments efficiently. Further, the protection of the liability rule is limited in unusual ways, 
                                                           
9 See Guido Calabresi & A Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089, 1092-93 (1972), see also Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: 
Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate Coasian Trade, 104 Yale L.J. 1027, 1036-72 (1995), Louis Kaplow& 
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 715 (1996). 
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much more so than in the context of private contracts.  This feature, we believe, is attributable 
to the fact that formal sanctions are a relatively unimportant factor in inducing member nations 
to live up to their commitments.  The following sections elaborate these claims.   
 
   II.  Renegotiation and Modification of Concessions in the WTO System 
Public choice teaches that the objectives which individual countries pursue through 
international agreements are determined by an interaction among organized interest groups.11 
While this process is not fully understood and assuredly varies across nations, there is wide 
agreement that producer interests will exercise disproportionately greater influence than will 
consumer interests, at least in the democracies which dominate the developed world (and thus 
the trading community).12 Hence, multilateral agreements that reduce trade barriers are not 
driven primarily by a desire to benefit consumers (despite the fact that they do), but by a desire 
to benefit certain producer groups. Trade concessions by one nation are made in exchange for 
reciprocal trade concessions by other nations that will afford exporters greater access to foreign 
markets. Exporters will reward their political officials for securing these concessions. Where 
these political rewards exceed the political costs associated with reduced protection for import-
competing domestic industries, political officials will benefit on balance and conclude 
agreements for mutual reduction of trade impediments.13 
But the parties to trade agreements, like the parties to private contracts, enter the 
bargain under conditions of uncertainty. Economic conditions may change, the strength of 
interest group organization may change, and so on. Accordingly, officials cannot be certain that 
the bargain they strike will benefit them in all of its details. Likewise, even where the bargain 
on a particular issue is initially beneficial, changing circumstances may make it politically 
unappealing. For these reasons, the drafters of trade agreements may be expected to include 
devices for adjusting the bargain when it proves mutually disadvantageous. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
10 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 9, at 1092-93; Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 9, at 715. 
11 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 28; see generally Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice 2-3 (1973), Mancur 
Olson, Jr., The Logic of Collective Action, 1132-67 (1965). 
12 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 28, see also Alan O. Sykes, Protectionism as a “Safeguard”: A Positive 
Analysis of the GATT “Escape Clause” with Normative Speculations, 58 U.Chi. L. Rev. 255, 275 (1991). 
13 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 28-29, see also Robert Baldwin, “The Economics of the GATT,” in Issues 
in International Economics, (Peter Oppenheimer, ed. 1980); Sykes, supra note 12, at 275, Mueller, supra note 11, at 
123.  See generally Beth Yarbrough and Robert Yarbrough, Cooperation and Governance in International Trade 
(1992). 
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As noted above, the performance of contractual obligations becomes inefficient when 
the benefits to the promisee(s) of performance are less than the costs to the promisor of 
performance. Joint gains then arise if the promisor does not perform, gains that can be 
distributed ex ante or ex post in any manner that the parties prefer.  Although this theory of 
efficient performance and nonperformance has been developed with reference to private 
contracts, where the costs and benefits of performance may be measured in money, it applies 
equally to other bargains such as trade agreements.  And the theory of public choice suggests 
that the metric of welfare for each signatory to a trade agreement will not be money, but 
instead will be the political welfare (votes, campaign contributions, graft, as the case may be) 
of its political officials.14 Any Pareto optimal trade agreement must maximize a weighted sum 
of this welfare measure for each signatory government.15 Implicit, then, in any optimal 
agreement is a set of weights (called shadow prices by economists) that allow the political 
welfare of one government to be traded off against the welfare of another. 
The welfare weights implicit in any Pareto optimal agreement also serve to identify the 
conditions under which the nonperformance of obligations is efficient. When the political 
burden of performance to an promisor exceeds the political detriment of nonperformance to the 
promisee(s), evaluated at the proper weight or shadow price, nonperformance is jointly 
desirable. Roughly speaking, the political costs of performance may be said to exceed the 
benefits of performance, just as benefits may exceed costs in the case of a private contract 
where both are measured in money. It is in the interests of parties to trade agreements to 
facilitate nonperformance under these conditions.16 
Following our earlier discussion, the parties to any kind of contract can facilitate 
efficient adjustment of obligations in three ways. First, they can specify in the contract itself 
the conditions under which performance will not be required or the price for a part to buy out 
of a particular obligation -- force majeure clauses and liquidated damages clauses in private 
contracts are examples of this approach.  Second, when their contract is incomplete as to 
certain contingencies that mat arise, they can agree on (or embrace a legal system that provides 
                                                           
14 See Mueller, supra note 11, at 2-3. 
15 See Schwartz & Sykes, supra note 3, at 28-29, cf. Eric Talley, Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic 
Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine, 108 Yale L.J. 277, 321 (1998) (“The Analysis that follows posits 
that an “optimal contract” consists of the contractual terms (w, d) that maximize the weighted sum of the parties’ 
expected payoffs as viewed from the time of contracting.”) 
16 A formal model developing these results may be found in Sykes, supra note 12, at Appendix. 
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them with) a liability rule that encourages efficient nonperformance.  As discussed above, the 
familiar rule of expectation damages in contract law is such a rule. Third, the parties can 
embrace a property rule and simply renegotiate when performance becomes inefficient.  The 
promisor can buy its way out of the obligation to perform by paying the promisee(s) an amount 
that makes it whole and still leaves the promisor better off than with performance of the 
original obligation. 
The provisions of the WTO agreements pertaining to renegotiation exhibit aspects of 
the first two approaches but stop short of creating a property rule. Consider first the Article 
XIX escape clause, which authorizes temporary measures that would otherwise violate WTO 
commitments for the protection of industries that are experiencing severe dislocation due to 
increased import competition.17  Such industries are likely to have rates of return well below 
the competitive level, and as a result to be losing quasi-rents on fixed investments. They will 
lobby more vigorously for protection on average than other industries because the benefits of 
protection are less dissipated (if at all) by new entry -- to the extent that protection merely 
raises the rate of return toward the competitive level, no new domestic competitors will be 
induced to enter the industry.18 Industries that are profitable and growing are likely to have 
returns above the competitive level in many cases, which will eventually be dissipated by entry 
regardless of government policy at home or abroad. Hence, they have less incentive to lobby 
for domestic protection and less incentive to punish their political leaders for failing to 
maintain access to foreign markets at historical levels. Accordingly, it will be politically 
efficient from the perspective of parties to trade agreements to afford transitory protection to 
import-competing industries suffering severe dislocation, at the expense of growing and 
prosperous foreign competitors. The escape clause permits such measures, and may thus be 
viewed as an example of the first option above for facilitating efficient nonperformance -- a 
provision written into the contract that excuses performance under specified contingencies. 
                                                           
17 See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XIX(1)(a).  The provision reads in full: 
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the Effect of the obligations incurred by a 
contracting party under this Agreement, including tariff consessions, any product is being 
imported into the territory of that contracting parties in such increased quantities and under such 
conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or 
directly competitive products, the contracting party shall be free, in respect of such product, and to 
the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury, to suspend the 
obligation in whole or in part or to withdraw or modify the concession. 
18 See Sykes, supra note 12, at 274. 
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To be sure, the concern arises that a nation may abuse its right to use the escape clause, 
imposing protection when it creates more political detriment abroad than can be justified by the 
benefits it creates at home. A compensation requirement can help to deter such inefficient 
behavior and was included in the escape clause system until the Uruguay Round.19 The new, 
partial exemption from the compensation requirement for the first three years of an escape 
clause measure20 suggests a judgment by the WTO membership that oversight by the 
strengthened dispute resolution process can adequately police abuse of such measures, and that 
a compensation requirement is no longer essential to keep the member nations "honest."21 
A more comprehensive provision for adjustment of the bargain is Article XXVIII of 
GATT 1994 (and its GATS counterpart Article XXI).22 Unlike Article XIX, Article XXVIII 
does not set out specific contingencies under which deviation from obligations is permissible, 
but instead establishes a procedure under which, subject to certain constraints, any tariff 
concession can be withdrawn for any reason for an indefinite period of time.  It requires as part 
of this process that nations seeking to withdraw concessions offer compensatory concessions to 
affected trading partners.23  But it is noteworthy that Article XXVIII does not require the 
member who is withdrawing a concession to secure the permission of affected trading partners 
-- it does not create a property rule.  Instead, although members are asked to negotiate mutually 
satisfactory compensation with other members if possible, Article XXVIII provides that a 
member may proceed to withdraw concessions in cases where negotiations over compensation 
break down, and further provides that adversely affected trading partners may at that point 
unilaterally withdraw substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations.24 Ultimately, 
then, concessions are protected by a "liability rule." And the magnitude of "liability" is clearly 
                                                           
19 See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art XIX(3)(a) (“If agreement among the interested contracting parties with respect 
to the action is not reached, the contracting party which proposes to take or continue the action shall, nevertheless, 
be free to do so, and if such action is taken or continued, the affected contracting parties shall then be free . . . to 
suspend . . . such substantially equivalent concessions or other obligations under this Agreement the suspension of 
which the [GATT membership as a whole does] not disapprove.”). 
20 See Agreement on Safeguards in Legal Instruments vol. 1, 33 I.L.M. at 1128 (1994), at art. 19. 
21 See Korean Decision.  
22 See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art XXVIII.  See also General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, Legal Instruments vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 
44 (1994) [hereinafter GATS], at art. XXI. 
23 See GATT 1994, supra note1, art. XXVIII(2) (“In such negotiations and agreement, which may include provision 
for compensatory adjustment with respect to other products, the contracting parties concerned shall endeavour to 
maintain a general level of reciprocal and mutually advantageous concessions not less favourable to trade than that 
provided for in this Agreement prior to such negotiations.”) 
24 See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. XXVIII(3). 
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specified -- concessions "substantially equivalent" to those withdrawn by the member that 
proceeds under Article XXVIII. 
We believe that the explanation for these provisions lies in the desire of signatories to 
facilitate efficient breach, and in the relative superiority of a liability rule approach to that task.  
At first blush this claim may seems surprising, because the harm done to political officials by a 
breach of promise in the WTO is no doubt difficult to measure precisely, and when “damages” 
are hard to calculate, that fact is usually thought to be a heavy thumb on the scale favoring a 
property rule over a liability rule.  But there is a countervailing consideration here that is 
compelling.  Under the most-favored-nation principle of the WTO, 25 trade concessions must 
extend equally to all WTO Members (WTO membership includes 144 countries at this 
writing26). Hence, under a property rule, a nation seeking to depart from a prior concession 
would have to secure the permission of potentially dozens of other nations.  It would then face 
an acute hold-out problem as each of the many promisees tried to capture as much as possible 
of the gain that the promisor could realize from avoiding the concession. Such strategic 
behavior might prevent agreement from being reached at all, or at least delay it uneconomically 
while negotiation and posturing dragged along. The liability rule approach of Article XXVIII 
averts this problem. 
Further, by limiting the retaliatory withdrawal of concessions to those "substantially 
equivalent," the system seeks to ensure that the price for nonperformance under the liability 
rule is not too high. Although the phrasing is somewhat vague, a withdrawal of "substantially 
equivalent" concessions may be understood as allowing members adversely affected by a 
withdrawal of concessions under Article XXVIII to raise their level of political welfare by 
reimposing protection for the benefit of domestic constituencies that will reward them for it, 
but only up to the point that their level of political welfare is restored to its original level. 
Indeed, during discussions on Article XXVIII in the Tariff Agreements Committee in 1947, the 
proposal to include a provision for compensatory withdrawal was explained as follows: "...if 
we wish to take an item out of our Schedule then clearly it is fair and proper that the countries 
with whom we negotiate should be free to make the corresponding changes in their Schedules 
                                                           
25 See GATT 1994, supra note 1, art. I:1 (requiring “that any privilege, advantage, or benefit granted to imports from 
one [WTO] member be extended to imports of similar products from all other [WTO] members.”), see also GATS, 
supra note 22, art. II:1 (including nearly identical most favored nation status to members). 
26 See World Trade Organization website, www.wto.org.  
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in order to restore the balance ... but we want any such exercise to be limited to what is 
corresponding and not to be used in a punitive way." In other words, political expectations 
under the bargain are protected by a rough equivalent of expectation damages, but nations are 
disabled from insisting on more -- any greater level of retaliatory withdrawal would raise the 
price of nonperformance above the costs to the disadvantaged promisees and thus discourage 
efficient nonperformance. 
 
III.    The Liability Rule Remedy for Violation of WTO Obligations 
The most intriguing use of a liability rule in the WTO system is pursuant to the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU), which governs claims by one member nation that another 
has violated its obligations.  Article 21(3) of the DSU provides that a member has a reasonable 
period of time to bring its policies into conformity with its obligations after it has been found to 
have violated them.27  Article 22(1) then states that compensation or a suspension of 
concessions may result if compliance has not been achieved within a reasonable period of 
time.28  The first step in the process is a negotiation over compensation, in effect to determine 
whether the case can be "settled."29  Should those negotiations fail, the aggrieved party(ies) can 
propose a suspension of concessions, which must be "substantially equivalent" to the ongoing 
harm that they suffer from the violation.30  An arbitration procedure exists to examine the 
"substantial equivalence" question if the member faced with such a suspension of concessions 
objects that the suspension is excessive.31  
Plainly, as with Article XXVIII discussed above, this system is best seen as one 
embracing a liability rule rather than a property rule.  A party found to be in violation of its 
obligations can, if it so chooses, continue to violate them.  The ultimate price to be paid, if the 
case is not settled, is the withdrawal of substantially equivalent concessions.  This structure 
                                                           
27 See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 21(3) (“If it is impractical to comply immediately with the recommendations and 
rulings, the Member concerned shall have a reasonable period of time in which to do so.”) 
28 See DSU, supra note 2, at art 22(1) (“Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are 
temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not implemented within a 
reasonable period of time.”) 
29 See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22(2) (“[S]uch Member shall, if so requested, and no later than the expiry of the 
reasonable period of time, enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, 
with a view to developing mutually acceptable compensation.”) 
30 See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22(4) (“The level of the suspension of concessions or other obligations authorized 
by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of nullification or impairment.”) 
31 See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22(6-7). 
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must, we submit, reflect a collective judgment that a property rule (for example, a threat to 
expel the recalcitrant violator if it does not cease and desist) would be inferior. The reasons 
why relate to the considerations discussed above -- the large transaction costs and opportunities 
for strategic behavior that would arise if a member trying to adjust its obligations had to secure 
the permission of all of the affected members. 
Recent WTO decisions make clear that our interpretation of WTO law is correct, even 
if they do not clearly acknowledge the “liability rule” nature of the system.  In the “bananas” 
dispute between the United States and the European Union, the EU declined to comply with a 
panel ruling finding that its tariff preferences for bananas from certain nations violated WTO 
law.  The United States then invoked its retaliation rights, and proposed substantial sanctions 
that the EU challenged before an arbitration panel as excessive.  In defending its proposed 
sanctions, the United States argued that its “suspension (of trade concessions) is an incentive 
for prompt compliance…precision in measuring trade damage is not required.”  The United 
States thus suggested, in effect, that the purpose of the sanction was to enforce a property rule 
and that careful calibration of sanctions was unnecessary.  The arbitrators rejected this position: 
”We agree with the United States…that it is the purpose of countermeasures to induce 
compliance.  But, this purpose does not mean that the DSB [Dispute Settlement Body] should 
grant authorization to suspend concessions beyond what is equivalent to the level of 
nullification or impairment.  In our view there is nothing in [the relevant provisions of the 
DSU] that could be read as a justification for countermeasures of a punitive nature.” 
By refusing to permit the imposition of “punitive” sanctions, the arbitrators impliedly 
acknowledged that the sanction is more in the nature of compensation than punishment.  They 
set a price for the EU’s persistence in its violation of WTO law equal to the harm caused to its 
trading partners.  The system thus allows violations to persist as long as the violator is willing 
to pay that price – the essence of a liability rule approach. 
We note that our conclusion is somewhat at odds with the views of other scholars in the 
field.  Professor John Jackson recently addressed the question whether a WTO member nation 
that had been found to be in violation of its commitments and that refused to bring its behavior 
into compliance should be deemed to be in violation of international law.32  He concludes that 
                                                           
32 See John H. Jackson, Editorial Comment, The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding – Misunderstandings on 
the Nature of Legal Obligations, 91 Am. J. Int’l. L. 60, 60 (1997) [hereinafter Misunderstandings]. 
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a refusal to comply with WTO treaty obligations is indeed a violation of international law, even 
if compensation is agreed upon or if a retaliatory suspension of concessions is in place.33 In so 
concluding, he in effect further concludes that a member of the WTO is obligated to comply 
with its obligations in all circumstances. 
Professor Jackson does not base his conclusion on policy, or on any articulation of why 
he believes that strict compliance with all obligations at all points in time should be the 
preferred outcome for the WTO membership.  Rather, Professor Jackson cites eleven textual 
provisions of the WTO in support of his position.  The two which powerfully make his 
argument are:  
 
1) Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are temporary 
measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not 
implemented within a reasonable period of time.  However, neither compensation nor 
the suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation 
of a recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered 
agreements.34 
 
2) The suspension of concession or other obligations shall be temporary…[T]he DSB 
shall continue to keep under surveillance the implementation of adopted 
recommendations or rulings . . .[while] the recommendations to bring a measure into 
conformity with the covered agreements have not been implemented.35 
 
We acknowledge that the provisions of the WTO relied upon Professor Jackson provide 
reasonable support for his conclusion that WTO members are obligated to comply with dispute 
resolution decisions that go against them.  We nevertheless disagree with that proposition, both 
as a matter of textual interpretation, and for policy reasons implicit in our discussion to this 
point. 
Our arguments from the text are straightforward.  The statement in the first passage that 
compliance is "preferred" is weak -- it does not say that compliance is mandatory, and it seems 
                                                           
33 See Misunderstandings, supra note 32, at 60. 
34 See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22(1). 
35 See DSU, supra note 2, at art. 22(8). 
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to us that this provision does not exclude the possibility that noncompliance may in some cases 
be acceptable.   The ongoing surveillance discussed in the second passage indeed hints at an 
obligation to comply, but there is certainly another interpretation.  Because circumstances 
change and the proper calibration of the "substantially equivalent" concessions may change as 
well, it is perhaps not surprising that the DSB should exercise some continuing oversight in 
these cases much as a conventional court might retain jurisdiction over a case where damages 
are payable over time (such as child support payments under family law or medical monitoring 
costs in tort).   Likewise, ongoing violations may have an impact on parties other than the 
original disputants.  Continued publicity and oversight may thus serve to alert other Members 
who might suffer redressable harm.  Finally, and related perhaps to the third party effects just 
mentioned, we do not dispute that a "preference" for compliance seems implicit in the system.  
Ongoing oversight thus serves to check periodically on whether the impasse that led to 
compensation or retaliation may have lifted. In effect, the violating country is required to 
persuade the international community that persisting in the violation is desirable.  Hence, the 
existence of continued oversight by no means excludes the possibility that members have the 
legal right to opt for paying "damages" in the form of a loss of trade concessions from other 
parties. 
Our final argument from the overall structure of the text is even more straightforward.  
We simply note that the provisions of the DSU, taken as a whole, allow a violator to continue a 
violation in perpetuity, as long as it compensates or is willing to bear the costs of the retaliatory 
suspension of concessions.  If WTO members really wanted to make compliance with dispute 
resolution findings mandatory, they would have imposed some greater penalty for 
noncompliance to induce it. 
Turning to policy, the starting point is the observation that the textual provisions cited 
by Professor Jackson both begin by asserting that the withdrawal of concessions is to be 
viewed as a “temporary” measure.  It would seem then that, at least for some “temporary” 
period of time, violation coupled with the withdrawal of concessions is acknowledged to be 
potentially superior to immediate compliance. Indeed, the fact that violators are given a 
reasonable period of time to conform their policies before sanctions or compensation become 
possible further supports the proposition that some period of deviation is seen as potentially 
valuable.  
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The reason why is not difficult to divine.  WTO violations are typically the result of 
domestic laws and regulations enacted by the violating country. Thus, curing the violation 
requires a new law or regulation repealing the one that constitutes the violation. For a number 
of reasons it may be politically difficult, conceivably impossible, to enact such a change.  The 
legislative and regulatory processes are, of course, elaborate and costly.  Proposed changes 
must compete for a place on the agenda.  Interest groups who gain from the violation will 
oppose repeal and be able to exploit differences among supporters of repeal as to what 
compensating benefits, if any, should be granted to the industries who will lose the benefits of 
the law.    
 If these factors make some delay in compliance inevitable, as the system apparently 
acknowledges and tolerates, there is no reason to think that they may not at times make 
compliance politically infeasible for an extended period of time.  And rather than expel the 
member who faces such political difficulty or impose some other draconian penalty, the system 
instead acknowledges that the joint interests of the parties may be better served by 
compensation or retaliation that restores the benefits of the bargain to aggrieved parties while 
allowing officials in the violator nation to continue doing what must be done out of political 
necessity. 
Indeed, if one is to claim that the purposes of the WTO members would be better served 
by compliance in all circumstances, it seems that one must believe that at the time the WTO 
rules were devised, the drafters were able to anticipate every situation in which the costs of 
compliance would exceed the benefits of compliance and include provisions to excuse 
compliance in all of these circumstances.  In the parlance of contract theory, the parties would 
have had to be able to write a complete contract expressly specifying what would be required 
in all circumstances that might arise.  We think it plainly unrealistic to think that the many 
parties to the WTO agreement, covering as it does matters of great complexity, could have 
done so successfully.  Knowing that, they framed a dispute resolution system deigned to 
facilitate efficient breach, using a sensible liability rule for that purpose. 
But there is one possible response that warrants attention.  It might be argued that strict 
compliance with the rulings of the dispute resolution process is desirable, and that adjustments 
to unanticipated circumstances should always be made via the renegotiation process of Article 
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XXVIII.  The drafters did not imagine that they could write a complete contract, the argument 
runs, but they wanted all changes to occur through tariff renegotiations.  
One difficulty with this argument is that it presupposes that changes in most-favored-
nation tariff rates can adequately address the political difficulties that arise from unanticipated 
circumstances.  It seems unlikely that this will be true.  The recent beef hormones case36 is a 
good illustration. The European Union was held to have violated its obligations under the 
WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures Code by prohibiting imports of hormone-raised 
beef, ostensibly because of health concerns.  If the continuation of the ban were nevertheless a 
political necessity for European officials, a uniform change in the tariff rates applicable to all 
beef from all sources, hormone-raised or not, could not replicate its effects.  Here, deviation 
from a non-tariff commitment would seem necessary, and renegotiation of tariffs a politically 
unsatisfactory substitute. 
In short, it seems clear to us that the WTO system contemplates departures from 
specified obligations when the costs of compliance exceed the associated benefits, whether 
those obligations are tariffs or non-tariff issues.  We can see no other purpose to the provisions 
allowing departure from obligations when agreement is not reached and conferring on the 
promisee only the right to withdraw substantially equivalent concessions.  Such a provision can 
only represent an institutional means for setting an appropriate “price” for violating 
commitments when the price cannot be determined through negotiations.   
 
IV.   The Limited Scope of Sanctions in the WTO/GATT System  
We have focused thus far on the role of a liability rule in the WTO system in facilitating 
efficient deviations from commitments following a change in circumstances.  We now consider 
the second role of a liability rule -- to deter violations when the benefits of compliance are 
greater than the costs of compliance. 
   A.  The Absence of Sanctions in GATT Prior to the WTO 
What is remarkable about the WTO/GATT system is how unimportant formal sanctions 
have been in encouraging compliance with trade commitments throughout its history.  As 
noted, the WTO succeeded the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which began 
                                                           
36 See Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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in 1947.37  Until 1995 when the WTO agreements superseded the GATT, it was effectively 
impossible for a nation found to have violated the GATT to become subject to formal 
sanctions.  The reason was the "consensus rule," which held that any nation could block the 
authority for the imposition of sanctions, including the nation that had violated the GATT and 
was threatened with them!38  Indeed, until 1989, a potential disputant could even block the 
formation of a dispute resolution panel to hear the merits of a complaint.39  As a result, GATT 
dispute resolution was limited to system that would often (but not always) hear the merits of a 
complaint and render a decision about the existence of a violation, but would never proceed to 
the point of imposing penalties when a violation was found.40  
Nevertheless, the GATT system held together rather well.  Tariffs in the developed 
world fell from an average of nearly 50% in 1947 to an average of about 5% by the end of the 
GATT.41 Some cheating on obligations occurred to be sure, but the level of cheating was 
modest. We are unaware, for example, of any allegation in the history of the system that a 
nation flagrantly refused to comply with one of its tariff commitments by raising a tariff rate 
above an agreed tariff limit.  Further, where "cheating" might be said to exist by some, it was 
often an efficient, tacit amendment of the bargain.42 When such tacit modifications are put to 
one side, the incidence of flagrant cheating under the GATT system was indeed quite low.43 
                                                           
37 See supra note 1. 
38 See John H. Jackson, The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations 117 (1999) 
(“[A] disputing nation could block adoption of a report and then argue that no binding requirement exists for it to 
follow the report.”); see also John H. Jackson, et al., Legal Problems of International Economic Relations: Cases 
Materials, and Text 830 (3d ed. 1995) (“Prior to the Uruguay Round, the Gatt dispute resolution process could be 
‘blocked’ by one of the disputants under the ‘concensus rule” – the losing party to a dispute had to agree to accept 
the outcome before any formal action could be taken to authorize sanctions.”). 
39 See 1989 Improvements to the GATT Dispute Settlement Rules and Procedures, 36th Supp. BISD 61 (1990). 
40 See Jackson, The World Trading System, supra note 38, at 116 (“Although the Contracting Parties were 
authorized (by majority vote) to suspend concessions (by way of retorsion, retaliation, or “balancing of benefits” – a 
term which is not and never has been clear), they actually did so in only one case.  That instance was the result of a 
complaint brought by The Netherlands against the United States for the latter’s use contrary to GATT, of import 
restraints on imported dairy products from The Netherlands.  For seven years in a row, The Netherlands was 
authorized to utilize restraints against importation of U.S. grain, although it never acted on that authorization.  This 
had no effect on U.S. action, however.”).   
41 See Multilateral and Regional Efforts to Integrate Markets: The Uruguay Round, NAFTA, Asia Pacific Economic 
Cooperation Initiatives, and the European Communities, 87 Am. Soc’y. Int’l. L Proc. 340, 349 (1993) (remarks of 
Herman von Bertrab, NAFTA Office, Embassy of Mexico). 
42 For example, the general failure of parties to demonstrate under the Escape Clause that a surge in import 
competition was attributable to a particular trade concession and that it was “unforeseen," as required by Article 
XIX, was really a tacit amendment to the original GATT that all parties accepted and that was later incorporated into 
the Safeguards Agreement.  See Sykes, supra note 12, at 287-88. 
43 See Robert E. Hudec, et al., A statistical Profile of GATT Dispute Settlement Cases: 1948-1989, 2 Minn. J. Global 
Trade 1, 32-34 (1993). 
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Our explanation for this state of affairs emphasizes that there are strong forces inducing 
countries to comply with their obligations even though no costs would be formally imposed on 
them by the GATT if they deviate. Three considerations explain why the system worked as 
well as it did -- the domestic costs of violations, reputational sanctions for non-compliance, and 
unilateral retaliation against violators. 
      1. Domestic Costs of Violations 
It will often be true that domestic political considerations encourage a country to 
comply with its commitments under trade agreements. This is true for two sets of reasons. 
The first relates to the way the balance of political forces favoring trade protection and 
trade liberalization will change following the advent of a market-opening trade agreement.  As 
a preliminary, protectionism induces inefficient investments in the domestic production of 
certain goods and services by importing nations. Those investments commonly entail sunk 
costs in the form of physical capital that cannot readily transfer to other uses, and specific 
human capital with the same property. The owners of these sunk investments will lose quasi-
rents on them if protection is removed, and will thus devote resources to the political process to 
protect those rents.44  These efforts by import-competing firms and workers may prove 
insufficient to prevent the lowering of trade barriers, however, because the exporters who 
benefit from reciprocal trade liberalization may be willing to "pay" more to their officials to 
secure access to foreign markets than import-competing interests will "pay" to keep their 
market protected.  If so, a trade agreement will be struck.  
Following the trade agreement, the rate of return to firms and workers in the formerly 
protected industries will tend to fall below a competitive level due to the introduction of more 
efficient foreign competitors, and they will begin to exit. Concomitantly, their sunk 
investments decay over time as physical capital depreciates and specific human capital is 
replaced by the workers who retrain to work in other industries.  The pressure from the owners 
of sunk investments for the reimposition of protection should fall steadily as these specific 
investments decay.  In the limiting case, no specific investments remain and renewed 
protection would simply necessitate new investment in an industry that would earn no more 
than a competitive rate of return.  No one would benefit from such protection given the 
                                                           
44 See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Cases, 16 Int’l. Rev. of 
Law & Econ. 5, 24 (1996). 
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opportunity to earn competitive returns elsewhere, and the pressure for renewed protection 
would drop to zero. In more realistic cases, some pressure for protection will remain from 
those whose human or physical capital would earn at least transitory rents from protection, but 
the magnitude of that pressure ought still be considerably lower in most cases than before trade 
was liberalized in the first instance and sunk investments in the protected industry were much 
more important. 
Reciprocally, political pressure to resist renewed protection may grow with time. 
Particularly where the imports in question are utilized by producing industries, which tend to 
be better organized than ordinary consumers, a constituency may develop whose returns to 
their own fixed investments would be impaired by a significant increase in the price of imports. 
In sum, the political balance of interests favoring and opposing the results of a trade 
agreement may be expected to tilt quite systematically toward those favoring the agreement as 
time passes.  A fortiori, the political pressure to comply with market-opening commitments in 
trade agreements will tend to strengthen over time, and pressures to deviate from many 
commitments may simply disappear. We conjecture that this phenomenon also has much to say 
about the reasons why the GATT system has slowly ratcheted down protection through a series 
of "rounds" over the years -- each round goes as far as it can given the resistance from import 
competing industries, but as that resistance decays after each round is completed, new 
opportunities for politically profitable deals emerge with time. It may also explain why 
concessions often had to be implemented only gradually over time. 
A second domestic political reason why nations may be inclined to comply with their 
trade commitments relates to the fact that it may be more costly for interest groups to seek 
protection than to resist its abolition. In the United States, for example, trade agreements are 
followed by implementing legislation that conforms federal law (including tariff rates) to the 
new agreement. A constituency favoring renewed protection, then, must incur the costs of 
changing a federal statute. Prior to the agreement, by contrast, those favoring trade 
liberalization must incur the costs of changing the federal statute (as well as of encouraging the 
international negotiation). It is likely easier to defend an existing statute than to change it for a 
variety of reasons. Time on the legislative agenda is scarce. Also, individual members of 
Congress (such as key committee chairs) may have the effective power to veto change, yet they 
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will lack the power by themselves to effect change. Thus, parties resisting change may need 
fewer political figures to support them than parties seeking change. 
As a result, once a trade liberalizing agreement is reached and implemented, the balance 
of political power may shift importantly and immediately against those who were previously 
the beneficiaries of protection. When this fact is coupled with the fact that their sunk 
investments will begin to decay and their returns to renewed protection will accordingly 
diminish with time, it seems plausible to us that the constituency for renewed protection will 
often lack the political muscle to secure it, even if renewed protection would not result in any 
international sanction of consequence. 
We do not suggest, however, that a renewal of protection would always be unilaterally 
unattractive. After all, the fact that protection had once been afforded indicates that the political 
forces benefiting from it were powerful enough to secure it. It is certainly unrealistic to 
suppose that every time a trade agreement is struck, the forces supporting renewed protection 
lose so much relative influence that they could not effectively prevail on their governments to 
restore it if there were no international penalty to be paid. We thus turn to other factors that 
help encourage adherence to trade commitments. 
     2. Reputation 
Nations that renege on their commitments may be expected to face some reputational 
cost in the form of having to deal with other nations on less favorable terms in the future. This 
cost will be borne not only in future dealings with the nation aggrieved by a breach of promise, 
but also in dealings with all other nations that are aware of the breach. 
The skeptic might question whether such reputational penalties will be of much 
importance in the trading system, however, because their costs might seem to be widely 
diffused. If the United States reneges on a WTO obligation, for example, such behavior might 
be expected to diminish the opportunity for the United States to strike favorable trade deals in 
future negotiating sessions. Yet, the domestic beneficiaries of those deals might be hard to 
predict and the benefits lost by any single organized group might be small in present value. 
Accordingly, therefore, one might conjecture that no domestic interest group would worry 
much about the consequences of reneging for the nation's reputation, and hence that a fear of 
reputational damage to the nation will not much constrain domestic political officials who 
otherwise find it in their interest to renege on promises. 
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This skeptical view is wrong for three reasons. First, in the WTO/GATT system, 
negotiations are ongoing more or less in perpetuity. Of late, for example, negotiations over 
commitments in various service sectors remain very much on the table, as do a number of other 
topics. In many instances, therefore, the loss of an ability to make credible promises will 
immediately come back to haunt negotiators representing specific and well organized groups 
with a current stake in negotiating progress. 
Second, it would be a mistake to suppose that reputation is cabined to the trade area. 
Nations are engaged in a never-ending series of diplomatic initiatives on matters ranging from 
trade to national security to human rights and so on. Typically, the entity that represents a 
nation in trade negotiations (in the United States, the Executive Branch) must also negotiate on 
these other matters. It is quite likely, therefore, that a linkage exists between credibility in the 
trade negotiating field and credibility on other matters of current concern. 
Third, even if reputational costs in the form of foregone opportunities for future trade 
liberalization would be borne by a fairly diffuse group of exporters, it does not follow that they 
will be ineffective at organizing today to protect themselves. Exporting interests can form 
associations with the mission of overcoming such collective action difficulties. Entities like the 
American Chamber of Commerce, for example, can and do serve that function. Likewise, 
exporters can install political agents with their interests at heart (either because of the agents' 
ideology or because of their employment prospects on leaving government). These agents will 
then act to protect their reputations as effective negotiators for export interests (the USTR is 
illustrative) by actively opposing any proposals to renege on past bargains. 
One difficulty with reputational penalties, of course, is that they depend on the quality 
of information in the trading community about the behavior of violators. Such information may 
be particularly imperfect as to violations by trading partners that affect third countries -- that is, 
if the United States reneges on an obligation to Brazil, will the European Union find out about 
it and take it into account with respect to future dealings with the United States? 
This concern highlights the value of a central dispute authority to hear the merits of 
complaints, even if that authority has no power to authorize sanctions. By serving as a vehicle 
for transmitting information about violations throughout the trading system, central dispute 
resolution enhances the reputational costs of cheating. We think that under the consensus-based 
system of the old GATT, this was the primary function of the dispute system. Further, the fact 
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that a disputant could block the formation of a panel to hear the merits until 1989 did not 
destroy the efficacy of the system. For in most cases, the refusal of a disputant to allow the 
formation of a dispute panel would suffice for an adverse inference by other nations. 
If this last claim is correct, however, why did the system evolve in 1989 into one in 
which disputants could no longer block the formation of dispute panels to hear the merits? Two 
answers may be given. 
First, cases may have existed in which blocking did not suffice for an adverse inference. 
Nations might have claimed, for example, that their decision to block a panel rested on the 
costliness of the panel process, or on some fear that the panel process could not be expected to 
resolve the case correctly. It may have been difficult for other nations to tell when such 
assertions were disingenuous, and if so the decision by the members to afford panels 
automatically may have indeed been taken to enhance the reputational penalties for violators. 
Alternatively, dispute rulings may provide public goods to an extent. Contract theory 
teaches that parties leave gaps in contracts, or use ambiguous language, because it is too costly 
to anticipate what behavior will be in their joint interests or to express precisely what behavior 
is optimal under every imaginable contingency. When contractual incompleteness leads to 
disputes, a third party enforcer can generate joint gains for the parties by resolving the dispute 
in the way that maximizes joint welfare, that is, in the way that corresponds to what the parties 
would have chosen for themselves in the absence of transaction costs.45  Of course, gap-filling 
by a third party enforcer is not helpful if the resultant gap fillers are chosen improperly. But the 
agreements that constituted the GATT system were exceedingly elaborate, ultimately growing 
to hundreds of pages in length and replete with various principles on which panels could draw 
to guide their analysis (the new WTO agreements are even more elaborate so the point carries 
forward). It is thus plausible that panel-generated gap fillers under the WTO/GATT system 
serve the joint interests of the members in a fairly high percentage of cases.  
A party to a dispute might nevertheless have blocked the formation of a panel if it 
expected that it would probably lose. Even if an adverse inference would then have been drawn 
by others about the behavior of that party, there may still have been some virtue in ensuring 
that the panel process could go forward anyway to help clarify the terms of the bargain for 
                                                           
45 See generally Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and 
Judicial Strategies, 21 J. Leg. Stud. 271 (1992). 
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everybody. This may have become increasingly true with time, as the GATT system came to 
encompass more and more side agreements covering many topics. The decision in 1989 to 
allow complaining parties to obtain a panel decision as a matter of right, therefore, may have 
reflected increasing benefits to the use of the panel process to generate gap fillers for the 
membership owing to the increasing complexity of the system. 
In summary, we believe that reputation played and continues to play an important role 
in enforcing the rules of the trading system. But we do not wish to overstate the case. No doubt 
reputation functions as an imperfect check on opportunism here, as elsewhere most of the time. 
Thus, the system also has room for sanctions beyond simply reputational costs. 
     3. Unilateral Sanctions 
When a nation breaches a trade commitment and the harm done is material and 
noticeable to the foreign exporters that benefit from the promise, those interest groups may be 
expected to complain to their political representatives and to reward those officials for taking 
action to correct the problem. Regardless of the nature of third party dispute resolution at the 
international level, therefore, nations will have an incentive to punish breach of promise by 
other nations. And to the extent that sanctions will take the form of protectionist measures that 
benefit domestic industries in the sanctioning country, they may actually generate political 
rewards from those industries for the officials that impose them, further adding to the incentive 
to employ them. 
The prospect of unilateral sanctions is not merely hypothetical. In the United States, 
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 has long authorized the Executive Branch to retaliate for 
breach of trade agreements by other nations.46 The European Union has a similar statute on the 
books, and both statutes have been utilized.47 In other nations, statutory enactments authorizing 
retaliation may be absent, but the inherent powers of political authorities to take action often 
make formal authority unnecessary. 
The growth of unilateral retaliation was a natural response to the consensus rule that 
prevented centralized sanctions. Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that Section 301 and its 
various formal and informal international counterparts (the European Community enacted a 
                                                           
46 See Trade Act of 1974, §§ 301-06 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2411-16), as amended, Pub.L. No. 96-39, tit. IX, 93 
Stat. 295 (1979), Pub.L. No. 98-573, §§ 304, 306, 98 Stat. 3002 (1984); Pub. L. No. 100-418, §§ 1301-02. 
47 See, e.g., Council Regulation (EEC) No. 264/84 on the Strengthening of the Common Commercial Policy with 
Regard in Particular to Protection Against Illicit Commercial Practices, Eur. Comm. O.J. L. 252/1 (Sept. 20, 1984). 
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"mirror" statute) were valuable tools for holding the trading system together, affording useful 
"self-help" strategies in the face of the limitations in the GATT dispute settlement system.48  
The skeptic might again respond, however, that the prospect of unilateral retaliation 
may be a relatively weak deterrent to violations. The effects of retaliation, the argument might 
run, will be felt by an unpredictable and diffuse set of export interests who each face relatively 
small expected costs of retaliation at the time a violation is contemplated. Collective action 
problems will impede them from organizing to oppose the violation. 
 Our answer here is much as before. Exporters will form associations to internalize these 
diffuse costs, and try as best they can to install agents in the political process who will take 
proper account of them. Furthermore, nations fearful that another may violate its commitments 
will find it in their strategic interest to preannounce targets of retaliation in order to mobilize 
them. The common practice in Washington of drawing up "retaliation lists" in Section 301 
cases prior to the imposition of any actual sanctions serves precisely this purpose.49 
     4.  Summary 
 For the reasons given here, the level of compliance with trade commitments is quite high 
even if there is no credible threat of sanctions for misbehavior.  The GATT system thus worked 
quite well without sanctions, and were it not for the recent innovations in the DSU we could 
end here.  But the drafters of the WTO agreements decided to replace the old GATT dispute 
resolution system with a meaningful prospect of formal sanctions for violations that are not 
corrected after a reasonable period of time.  We now offer an explanation for those changes in 
the system.  
 
B. The New Prospect of Sanctions For Violations that Are Not Cured Within a  
         Reasonable Time 
 The DSU changes the rules, and embraces a "reverse consensus" principle whereunder 
sanctions will be authorized after the dispute process has determined that a violation exists and 
a reasonable time for cure has elapsed, unless a consensus exists against sanctions (which 
                                                           
48 See Alan O. Sykes, Constructive Unilateral Threats in International Commercial Relations: The Limit Case for 
Section 301, 23 L. & Pol. Int’l. Bus. 263, 266 (1992). 
49 See, e.g., GATT: U.S., EC Announce Breakthrough in GATT Trade Talks, Oilseeds Dispute, 9 Int’l. Trade Rep. 
(BNA) 1990 (Nov. 25, 1992) (chronicling U.S. Trade Representative’s compilation of a “retaliation list” for use 
under Section 301 against the European Community). 
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would have to include the party(ies) that filed the complaint and prevailed).50  Consequently, 
sanctions are a real threat to the recalcitrant violator and have already been employed a number 
of times. What has not been assigned sufficient importance, however, is that although the DSU 
made sanctions a real possibility it did not change another feature of the system which greatly 
restricts the value of sanctions in inducing nations to comply with their obligations.  As we 
have noted, a sanction cannot be imposed until a dispute panel finds that a violation has 
occurred, the appellate body affirms the panel’s finding if an appeal is filed, and the violation 
continues even though a reasonable period of time to cure it has elapsed.  Thus, the sanction 
operates only prospectively.   As a result, a country can commit a violation and continue it for a 
considerable time without bearing any formal penalty. 
 What is the logic of this new system?  Does its adoption put the lie to our claim that 
formal sanctions are not necessary to achieve a high level of compliance?  And if formal 
sanctions are indeed important to deter violations, why limit them to violators who have been 
caught and continue to cause harm after they have been given a chance to conform their 
behavior?  Does that not invite cheating in hopes of avoiding detection, followed by delay 
when caught to exploit the "reasonable time" for cure? 
 To answer these questions, we begin by reiterating the claim that flagrant cheating has 
been uncommon in the system through the years.  Domestic political constraints, concerns for 
reputation and unilateral sanctions indeed produced a high level of compliance under the 
GATT, and there is little reason to think that they would not work similarly in the WTO.  As a 
result, many of the disputes that arise (though not all) involve good faith clashes over 
ambiguous terms of the bargain.  In these circumstances, countries are often genuinely 
uncertain what they are obliged to do, and sanctions may have the effect of punishing them for 
good faith behavior.  Not only is there little deterrence value to such punishment, but it may 
prove somewhat destabilizing to the trading system and provide further political ammunition to 
those who would scuttle it on the basis of “sovereignty” claims and the like. 
 Indeed, as suggested earlier, there may be instances in which WTO provisions have been 
intentionally left vague because an expert body, deciding ex post what conduct is value 
maximizing, may be a better instrument for facilitating mutually advantageous conduct than 
the ex ante predictions of members as to what will be in their mutual advantage in the many 
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circumstances that may arise.  A country found to be in violation of such obligations after the 
fact may thus have supplied a public good by becoming the “test case” on a particular issue.  
The absence of sanctions for behavior prior to an adverse ruling may thus be seen as a way to 
encourage nations to litigate their disputes to conclusion so as to clarify the rules for everyone. 
 Once an adverse ruling comes down, however, matters change.  If rulings are indeed 
constructive gap fillers, compliance with them will ordinarily generate joint gains, and 
renegotiation of most-favored-nation tariff commitments will often (though not always, as 
discussed earlier) be a better way to protect import-competing industries than ongoing 
violations of non-tariff provisions.   
 Does this line of reasoning explain why sanctions are now available, following the lapse 
of a reasonable time for cure?  We must answer no lest we introduce inconsistency into our 
argument.  For once a ruling adverse to a WTO member is issued, a refusal to comply would 
otherwise be subject to the same reputational penalties and unilateral sanctions that we 
discussed earlier.  Why are they not enough, and what motivated the drafters of the DSU to 
introduce the prospect of meaningful sanctions at this stage of the process? 
    Our answer is to suggest that the innovation of the DSU was intended not so much to 
deter violations of most substantive rules, for such violations if clear were already fairly well 
deterred as we have argued. What the new system really adds is the opportunity for the losing 
disputant to “buy out” of the violation at a price set by an arbitrator who has examined 
carefully the question of what sanctions are “substantially equivalent” to the harm done by the 
violation. 
       By contrast, the situation immediately prior to the entry into force of the WTO was one in 
which unilateral retaliation was becoming more and more common.  Cases under Section 301 
of the U.S. Trade Act of 1974, in particular, were becoming more frequent.  And the 1988 
amendments to that statute created a timetable for retaliatory action by the United States that 
could require it to sanction an alleged violator even before the GATT panel process had run its 
course.51  The distinct possibility thus arose that the United States would impose a sanction 
based on a unilateral determination that another party was in breach of a the GATT, even if a 
dispute panel would find that the U.S. complaint lacked merit.   Further, although the statute 
directed the U.S. Trade Representative to impose a sanction commensurate with the burden on 
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U.S. commerce caused by the violation,52 the United States was the sole arbiter of whether its 
sanction in fact met that test.  The international community might thus have reason to be 
concerned that the United States might impose sanctions for the purpose of foisting an 
opportunistic construction of the bargain upon trading partners, or that the unilateral sanctions 
might be excessive and discourage efficient breach.  The political pressures for other trading 
nations to arm themselves with similar potentially disruptive unilateral strategies were no doubt 
considerable.  Thus, a fear was developing that unilateral sanctions in the name of enforcing 
the bargain were being co-opted in a way that would allow trading nations to renege on the 
bargain.  
     The skeptic will immediately wonder, however, why this type of reneging was not 
adequately constrained by the factors that we claimed were reasonably effective under the 
consensus-based system -- reputation and unilateral sanctions.  In one important respect, we 
believe it was.  In particular, a threat of unilateral sanctions could in principle be employed to 
induce a country to accept an excessively demanding interpretation of its obligations.  But, as 
one of us has argued, this did not occur.  The United States agreed to submit its claims of 
violations to determination by the GATT and, unless dispute resolution dragged on too long 
without result, the United States also committed itself to await the GATT determination and be 
bound by it.  In fact, the United States never acted contrary to a GATT ruling -- it never "took 
the law into its own hands" in finding a violation by another party.  Accordingly, one of us 
previously concluded that United States actions under Section 301 did not advance excessively 
demanding interpretations of the obligations owed to it under the GATT.53  Such analysis 
suggests that with respect to the existence of a violation by another nation, the United States 
was substantially, if not perfectly, constrained by reputational concerns, reinforced by the 
possibility of authoritative GATT rulings against it and a fear of unilateral retaliation for 
misbehavior. 
       There is another dimension to unilateral sanctions and threats, however, that may have 
been subject to greater strategic manipulation.  When a violation occurs, a system of unilateral 
retaliation leaves it to the aggrieved nation to set the magnitude of the sanction.  Although the 
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GATT system had always required that any sanction be "substantially equivalent" to the harm 
done by the violation, the question of whether an actual or threatened sanction was excessive 
by this standard might be one about which the members of the trading community have very 
poor information.  Indeed, the harm caused by a violation to another country or to its political 
officials is almost certainly difficult for other nations to ascertain.  If so, a nation injured by a 
violation might be able to threaten or to impose an excessive sanction without incurring 
reputational penalties.  Consequently, excessive actual or threatened unilateral sanctions may 
have become an important actual or potential impediment to efficient breaches within the 
system.54 
       Under the new DSU, by contrast and as noted previously, a binding arbitration system is 
established to consider the magnitude of the sanctions.  No sanctions can be imposed until the 
arbitration process has run its course if the violator nation insists on it.  The new system thus 
does a better job of protecting violators from the actual or threatened imposition of excessive 
sanctions.  In turn, it ought perform better than the old system at ensuring that opportunities for 
efficient breach are not undermined. 
      The same conclusion can be reached in another way, which we think bolsters it 
considerably.  In particular, consider the question of what really changes under the new DSU?  
Penalties for breach existed under the old system, both in the form of reputational costs and 
unilateral sanctions.  The penalties for breach under the new DSU will, as a practical matter, be 
much the same -- reputational costs will attach to roughly the same degree as before (especially 
after the 1989 understanding that eliminated the ability of disputants to block the formation of 
a panel), and any sanctions approved by the DSB will continue to take the form of measures by 
the aggrieved country(ies) to punish the violator through a withdrawal of trade concessions.  
The primary difference is that those measures can now be reviewed by a binding arbitral panel 
process for excessiveness before they can be put in place, whereas before they were 
unilaterally announced and implemented without review by the GATT.   
      Thus, the innovation of the new DSU is very much consistent with, and we believe 
motivated by, the perception that unilateral sanctions were in need of greater centralized 
oversight.  If we are right, then the reason for authorizing sanctions against recalcitrant 
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violators in the new DSU is not to punish them so much as to protect them -- instead of having 
to buy their way out in a world of unilateral threats and counter threats unconstrained by 
central oversight, the new system ensures that the price for noncompliance will be set by an 
honest and unbiased effort to assess the harm to the affected party(ies). 
 
V.      Conclusion 
 Treaties are contracts of a sort, and the lessons developed by law and economics scholars 
regarding the way that private contracting parties structure their bargains accordingly have 
much to teach us about the structure of treaties.  In this paper we have argued that the WTO 
system prefers a liability rule to a property rule – roughly, expectation damages to a rule of 
specific performance -- primarily because of the transaction costs and holdup problems that 
would arise under a property rule in a system with 144 players.  We have further advanced a 
theory as to how formal sanctions are not needed to induce a high level of compliance with 
most WTO obligations, owing to the domestic pressures for compliance that often exist, and to 
the reputational penalties and unilateral sanctions that further pressure parties to respect their 
commitments even absent formal sanctions.  The value of dispute resolution cases, therefore, 
may lie more in clarifying the rules and filling in missing terms of the bargain rather than in 
detecting and punishing cheaters.  It is for this reason that the losing party in a dispute 
proceeding pays no penalty if they obey the recommendations of the dispute process.  Lastly, 
we argue that the recent advent of formal sanctions for parties that lose a dispute proceeding 
and refuse to conform their policies within a reasonable time is a response not so much to the 
undercompliance with substantive obligations that arises absent these sanctions, but to the 
danger of excessive unilateral sanctions that exists in the absence of centralized oversight 
regarding the magnitude of sanctions.  This problem arises because the harm done by a 
violation is not easily observable absent a careful examination by an arbitrator, and thus a party 
that imposes an excessive unilateral sanction will be hard to detect and thus will not suffer the 
usual penalties associated with misbehavior.  The new arbitral process substitutes an unbiased 
determination as to the proper magnitude of the sanction for a unilateral judgment about it by 
the aggrieved party, and thus better ensures that the price for deviating from WTO obligations 
is not set inefficiently high. 
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